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Introduction
How does globalization affect public employment? In the tradition of Wagner's Law and the related literature 1 about the long-term trends of public expenditures and the size of government, one may conjecture that if globalization makes countries wealthier but life also riskier, this will induce a larger public sector including employment. In his seminal contribution, Rodrik (2000) studied in a theoretical model the effects of international trade on public employment and indeed confirmed empirically that trade openness is positively associated with public employment in developing economies.
In Rodrik (2000) 's model, international trade is considered a source of risk and citizens will have a higher demand for social insurance as long as the level of trade openness increases.
This so-called "compensation hypothesis" suggests that the size of governments should be bigger under globalization to compensate for the negative consequences of international trade (economic globalization), which results in an extended welfare state (Rodrik, 1998) . On the contrary, the "efficiency hypothesis" states that the size of governments should be smaller to compete with the rest of the world; and therefore, a higher level of trade (economic globalization) will decrease the size of government and governments' capacity to finance the welfare state (see the literature review of Schulze and Ursprung, 1999) This paper revisits the debate by studying new measures of economic globalization and public employment in the under-researched 21st century data. Applying the empirical strategy of Rodrik (2000) , our innovation is to introduce two new datasets for measuring public employment and economic globalization into this debate, the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators (WWBI) dataset of World Bank (2018) and the revisited KOF globalization indices of Gygli et al. (2019) .
Our study finds that the used measures of economic globalization are negatively associated with public employment in a panel dataset of 92 developing economies for the period from 2000 to 2016. We also implement various robustness checks, such as including several controls and excluding outliers, all supporting the efficiency hypothesis for the developing economies in the 21st century.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology, data, and empirical model. Section 3 reports the empirical findings, and Section 4 provides the robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Methodology and Data
The analysed baseline equation is:
We use various measures of , and , in country i at time t. , denotes the vector of controls and , , and , represent the "time fixed-effects", the "country fixed-effects", and the "error term", respectively. For equation (1) international reserves, and the market diversification. "Overall" economic globalization measure combines "de jure" and "de facto" variables. 2 Thus, the dataset of Gygli et al. (2019) provides each and every aspect of economic globalization. To put it differently, the KOF indices are superior in terms of a variety of indicators in comparison to what Rodrik had available (just trade openness). We also depart from Rodrik's paper in terms of the sample; while his paper focuses on the data for the periods of 1960-1964 and 1985-1989 , our paper considers the period between 2000 and 2016.
Furthermore, we control for country size (GDP and population), macroeconomic stability (inflation rate), labour market conditions (labour force participation rate and index of labour market regulations), which can possibly affect the public employment. A higher level of institutional quality (e.g., democracy) is an important indicator of trust in government that there is merit in public procurement. 3 Therefore, we control for the level of institutional quality and examine political variables to see whether the baseline results vary with these indicators. We use indices of institutionalized democracy (index from 0 to 10), executive constraints concept (EXCONST) (index from 1 to 7), and POLITY2 (index from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10
(strongly democratic)) from the Polity IV Annual Time Series provided by Marshall et al. (2018) . We also use the index of civil liberties to control for informal institutions. Finally, we use dummy variables for legal origin and government ideology, which can also affect public employment in developing economies.
Details of all variables used in the paper and the descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix Table I . The correlation matrix for the main variables used in the regressions is provided in Appendix Table II . Table 1 provides the results of the baseline regressions of the equation (1) for the two public employment measures as the dependent variables. The results for PSE_STE are reported in columns (I), (II), and (III), while the results for PSE_SPE are provided in columns (IV), (V), and (VI). All results imply that economic globalization (ECI_KOF) decreases public employment and the coefficients of ECI_KOF are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level.
Empirical Results
We also use the de facto index of economic globalization (ECIdf_KOF) and the de jure index of economic globalization (ECIdj_KOF). Although all globalization measures are negatively related to public employment, the coefficient for ECIdj_KOF is not statistically significant for PSE_SPE. Overall, our findings are in line with the efficiency hypothesis.
Among the controls, the per capita GDP is negatively related to public employment in each and every estimation. In addition, the urban population is positively associated with PSE_STE but it is negatively associated with PSE_SPE. Rodrik (2000) finds that both per capita GDP and the urban population positively affect public employment. Finally, according to the results of the cluster-robust Hausman test the fixed-effects estimations are consistent (see notes in Table 1 ).
Robustness Checks
First, we use several additional controls and report the related results in Appendix Table III .
Specifically, we control for country size by including GDP and population, macroeconomic stability by incorporating the inflation rate, and labour market conditions by using labour market participation rates and an index of labour market regulations. Following Potrafke (2010), we control for government ideology by creating dummy variables for left and right governments as well as unclear orientations using the dataset of Cruz et al. (2018) . Furthermore, the quality of institutions can matter for the relationship between economic globalization and public employment (Potrafke, 2015) . For this purpose, we use several measures of quality of formal and informal institutions: Legal origins, "EXCONST", "POLITY2", and "democracy"
indices. The baseline results are statistically robust to including all of these controls.
Appendix Table IV also provides the results of robustness checks, excluding outliers and specific countries from the dataset using again equation (1) 
Conclusion
The paper studies the impact of economic globalization on public employment in a panel dataset of 92 developing economies over the period 2000-2016. After using several measures of public employment and economic globalization as well as implementing various robustness checks, we find a negative impact of economic globalization on public employment supporting the efficiency hypothesis over the compensation hypothesis. However, hyper-globalization (probably due to automation and digitalization) in the 21st century may significantly decrease public employment in developing economies.
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Appendix Notes: PSE_STE: public sector employment as the share of total employment, PSE_SPE: public sector employment as the share of paid employment, ECI_KOF: index of economic globalization, ECIdf_KOF: index of de facto economic globalization, ECIdj_KOF: index of de jure economic globalization.
